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❖ Autonomous Vehicle platooning
➢ Platooning Pros and challenges
➢ Platooning research questions
❖ Security in Platooning
➢ Security of  Vehicular Network
➢ Security of Control Systems
❖ Security of Control system in platoon
➢ Platoon Model 
➢ Insider and Outsider Attacks Design  
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●  Autonomous Vehicle:  
The car that drives itself. 
● Platooning:  
Group of Autonomous vehicles 
travelling together with relatively 
small spacing to improve capacity 
of highways and to minimize the 
rel tive velocity of the vehicl s.








● Operational Efficiency 
(Increase highway 
capacity) 
● Driving Comfort 
● Transit time Efficiency 
● Challenges:
● Computer failure
● Degrading performance 
in case of interception 
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Examples of attack on vehicular 
network
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Security  issues Attacks[1]
Availability Jamming attack; DoS attack.
Confidentiality Eavesdropping attack; Man in the middle attack.
Authentication GPS spoofing; Impersonation attack;  Masquerading attack;  
Message tampering.
Data Integrity Replay attack; Message modification attack.







High-speed collision induction attack[3];
Traffic flow instability attack[6,7].
Sensor reading tampering False data injection[5];
Efficiency-motivated attack[4]
Configuration of Autonomous 
Vehicles
13




The upper level controller determines the desired acceleration of 
automated vehicle based on measured range, range rate, speed, and 
acceleration. We only study longitudinal control not lateral control in 
this work.
Lower level controller
The lower level controller manipulates the engine and brake 
actuators to track the desired acceleration, which is estimated in the 
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Who Is the Attacker?
18
A single actor in control of a vehicle who attempt to 
disrupt the platoon.
● Outsider: Has NO prior knowledge of control law 
and only modify its motion.
● Insider: Modifying the control law and its motion.
Attacks Objectives
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 Outsider Attack Results
Let’s consider desired 
spacing between each 
vehicle is -ref =d(m) and 
d>0.  Then attacker can 
cause collision if 
spacing>=-d.
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The results clearly indicate that:
Both insider and outsider attackers can cause collisions.
But,
Insider attacker performs more powerful attack that 
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Level 0 _ No Automation System capability: None. • Driver 
involvement: The human at the wheel steers, brakes, accelerates, and negotiates 
traffic. • Examples: A 1967 Porsche 911, a 2018 Kia Rio.
Level 1 _ Driver Assistance System capability: Under certain conditions, the car 
controls either the steering or the vehicle speed, but not both simultaneously. • Driver 
involvement: The driver performs all other aspects of driving and has full 
responsibility for monitoring the road and taking over if the assistance system fails to 
act appropriately. • Example: Adaptive cruise control.
Level 2 _ Partial Automation System capability: The car can steer, accelerate, 
and brake in certain circumstances. • Driver involvement: Tactical maneuvers such 
as responding to traffic signals or changing lanes largely fall to the driver, as does 
scanning for hazards. The driver may have to keep a hand on the wheel as a proxy for 
paying attention. • Examples: Audi Traffic Jam Assist, Cadillac Super Cruise, 
Mercedes-Benz Driver Assistance Systems, Tesla Autopilot, Volvo Pilot Assist. 
Level 3 _ Conditional Automation System capability: In the right conditions, 
the car can manage most aspects of driving, including monitoring the environment. The 
system prompts the driver to intervene when it encounters a scenario it can’t navigate. 
• Driver involvement: The driver must be available to take over at any time. 
• Example: Audi Traffic Jam Pilot.
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Level 4 _ High Automation System capability: The car can operate without 
human input or oversight but only under select conditions defined by factors such as 
road type or geographic area. • Driver involvement: In a shared car restricted to a 
defined area, there may not be any. But in a privately owned Level 4 car, the driver 
might manage all driving duties on surface streets then become a passenger as the car 
enters a highway. • Example: Google’s now-defunct Firefly pod-car prototype, which 
had neither pedals nor a steering wheel and was restricted to a top speed of 25 mph.
Level 5 _ Full Automation System capability: The driverless car can operate on 
any road and in any conditions a human driver could negotiate. • Driver 
involvement: Entering a destination. • Example: None yet, but Waymo—formerly 
Google’s driverless-car project—is now using a fleet of 600 Chrysler Pacifica hybrids to 
develop its Level 5 tech for production.
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 Security Issues in Platoon
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1-Security in Vehicular network
    
● Availability 
● Confidentiality 








  Platooning Control Policy
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Inter-vehicle spacing Policies:
● Constant Spacing Policy (CSP), 
● Variable Time Gap (VTG),
 

















State Space representation (absolute 
coordinate 2n states and error (2n-2) states 





states xi and vi
